ABSTRACT The near field communication (NFC) is widely used on mobile devices and make it possible to take advantage of NFC system to complete mobile payment. But with the development of NFC, its problem are increasingly exposed, especially the security and privacy of authentication. The logic of events is a formal method to describe the protocol state transition and algorithm in concurrent and distributed systems, which can be used to prove the security of network protocols. Based on logic of events, we propose migration rule and derive inheritability to reduce redundancy and complexity of protocol analysis procedure and improve efficiency of protocol analysis. We study the KerNeeS protocol which providing mutual authentication between POS and NFC phone, and conclude that the protocol can guarantee mutual authentication property between entities involved in the payment for secure payment transactions. The logic of events can be applied to the formal analysis of similar mobile payment protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
The continuously increasing growth of developments in mobile technologies opened new opportunities to maximize the benefits of using mobile on a daily basis. Nowadays, mobile phones have great capabilities for the development of new applications, which are engaged in our daily lives. Moreover, mobile phones provide a new style of life, where the availability of many applications such as Internet browsing, sending and receiving e-mails, and mobile payment is one of the most important applications. The Near Field Communication (NFC) [1] , [2] technology is developed over Radio Frequency Identification (RIFD) [3] standards including the ISO 14443, it can be identified and exchanged with different compatible devices in short distance without touch, it's very suitable for mobile phones and PADs. An NFC purchase transaction between an NFC smartphone (or an NFC bank card) and an NFC point of sale terminal is performed instantaneously in a practical way within a short range of communication (around 10 centimeters) without any physical contact. The NFC technology has features of convenience and fast, which makes the mobile devices with NFC function increase greatly, more and more users choose mobile phones with NFC function as payment tools, and the mobile payment market is increasing year by year. In 2014, Apple Corp issued its first NFC payment tool Apple Pay. In March 2016, Samsung Pay, the Samsung NFC payment tool, officially launched. In August of the same year, Huawei also formally launched its own NFC payment tool Huawei Pay. The scale of China's mobile payment market is showing an explosive growth, it's estimated that by 2019, China's mobile payment market will reach the scale of 104 trillion yuan.
Since NFC is used to make payments in mobile phones, security issues raise more concerns among consumers. As a near filed communication technology, the communication transmission process is completely exposed an open and uncontrollable communication environment. So in the payment system NFC technology is used to transfer sensitive data between a card and a reader with limited security standards provided by NFC specifications, this makes NFC a common target to a number of attacks such as eavesdropping, data corruption, data tampering, man in the middle attack and so on [4] and [5] . Moreover, due to the similarity between RFID and NFC, most of attacks on RFID are applicable on the NFC [6] . In 2012, two American researchers found that there were serious security vulnerabilities in NFC payment, they can take subway for free after it being cracked. In 2013,
Journal of Engineering released a research report from the University of Survey's research group in UK, where researchers used special equipment to intercept sensitive data without contact. These series of incidents reflect the security issues of NFC technology, which threaten the mobile payment based on NFC technology and restrict the development of mobile e-commerce.
Formal methods are based on strict mathematical concepts and languages with clear semantics and unambiguous expression, it can discover the vulnerability of mobile payment protocols that other methods are not easy to find [7] . Theorem proving is significant method in formal methods, which describes the security protocol as an axiomatic system and the expected properties as a theorem that need to be proved. Theorem proving focuses more on the correctness of protocols, and it's difficult to automate proof procedures. Many scholars [8] - [10] have conducted in-depth research on theorem proving and have made great progress.
In this paper, based on logic of events [11] , combining with event structure, event classes and axiom cluster, we propose migration rule and derive inheritability to reduce redundancy and complexity of protocol proof procedures, and improve efficiency of protocol analysis. We study the KerNeeS protocol which providing mutual authentication between POS and NFC phone, and conclude that the protocol can guarantee authentication between entities involved in the payment for secure payment transactions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The related work is given in section II. In section III, the KerNeeS protocol will be introduced. In section IV, we introduce theory about logic of events, propose migration rule and derive inheritability to reduce redundancy and complexity of protocol analysis procedure based on logic of events, expound properties that need to be met in the procedure of identity authentication analysis. In section V, security proof of KerNeeS protocol will be elaborated in detail. In section VI, our conclusions and future work are given.
II. RELATED WORK
In response to security challenges, researchers proposed new schemes and protocols to ensure the security of mobile proximity payment. Yun-Seok et al. [12] proposed a scheme that uses the asymmetric encryption and hash function to try to eliminate the security and privacy threat, but it lacks some necessary security attributes, such as the message authentication. Madhoun N E and Guenane F [13] proposed a cloud based NFC payment security protocol that uses hash and symmetric encryption to provide mutual authentication for transaction process and can resist some attacks. Nikolaos Alexiou presented [14] a probabilistic model checking approach to evaluate resiliency of NFC protocol against relay attacks. Xu and Wang [15] proposed a new type of NFC authentication protocol, which is based on hyperlliptic curve cryptosystem to simplify key management and can provide mutual authentication service. The above research work mainly analyzes protocol security from the security of cryptosystem.
Due to the broadcast nature of wireless channel, wireless communication is prone to being attacked, many attacking methods, such as eavesdropping, message modification, and node impersonation, are presented. Thus, wireless security causes much attention. On one hand, more and more computing resources can be obtained by the attacker, on the other hand, the energy and computational resources of wireless devices is limited, computational-security-based cryptosystems restricted the further development of NFC payment. Hence, as an ingenious solution, the physical-layer-securitybased approach with high security becomes one of the hot research topics in wireless security [16] . Considering the presence of multiple eavesdroppers in communication, Shi et al. [17] designed, analyzed, and optimized the probabilistic caching placement, which can overhear the secure information transmission. Simulation and numerical results are provided to validate the proposed studies. To enhance the secrecy performance of wireless performance, relay selection techniques have been used in [18] and [19] . Specifically, the relaying techniques for enhancing the physical layer security have been study in [18] . In [19] , the optimal relay selection schemes based AF have been presented to improve wireless security and prevent eavesdropping attacks.
III. KerNees PROTOCOL A. PROTOCOL INTRODUCTION
KerNeeS [20] is proposed by Ceipidor from Sapineza University of Rome in 2012, which is intended to provide mutual authentication between an NFC phone (N) in card emulation mode and a POS (P), allowing phone and POS share a session key to use to perform secure transactions. This mechanism is possible by means of a trusted third entity, more specifically an Authentication Server (AS), able to verify the reliability of the entities involved in the money transaction, thus allowing not only the authentication of the smart card towards the POS, but also the authentication of the POS towards the smart card, This protocol only makes use of symmetric keys: POS and smart cards both are provided with an identifier (ID) and a symmetric key, shared with the Authentication Server. AS contains the association between device ID and shared key, as well as other information such as the trusted level of entities. The server has the same function of a Certification Authority but it works in real time and this is necessary to overcome the limitations of the smart cards.
B. PROTOCOL DESCRIPTION
This protocol was designed inside the RFID Laboratory of CATTID, Sapienza University of Rome, for mutual authentication between POS and smart cards.
Steps of the protocol are listed as follows: 1) Authentication request:
In the first step, the POS sends to the NFC phone a command containing a payload with a random value and a timestamp, both encrypted with the secret key of the POS, this message marks the beginning of a session by means of the timestamp.
2) Request confirmation
In the second step, the NFC phone replies to the POS with a message that contains the ID of the NFC phone without encryption, together with the random value concatenated to the message of the step (1), encrypted with K N . The random value R 2 acts as timestamp, in fact even if the NFC secure element cannot access to a system clock, it is able to distinguish sessions by means of R 2 .
3) Session request
The POS adds its ID to the message of the step (2) and delivers it to the authentication server. After the receipt of this message, AS analyzes it and if ID P and ID N are known, it fetches their keys, decrypts {R 2 , {R 1 , TS} K P }K N and then checks for the timestamp validity. If the timestamp is not valid, the Authentication Server doesn't reply, otherwise it generates a session key K and builds two tickets, one for the NFC phone and one for the POS. 4) Session confirmation
The Authentication Server sends the two tickets to the POS, that can't read or modify {K, ID P , R 2 }K N but it can fetch its own ticket and it is the only one (in addition to AS) able to decrypt {K, ID N , TS}K P . The POS decrypts {K, ID N , TS}K P , checks for the timestamp and the ID: if they are incorrect, it means that an error occurred and the POS has close the session, otherwise it fetches the session key, build a random value and encrypt the random value with the session key.
5) Verify request
In the step (5), P sent its ticket and the random value encrypted with the session key to N. At the receipt of the ticket, the phone is able decrypt it, because it is the only one to know the secret key K N (in addition to AS). Once decryption is complete, the phone checks for R 2 value, if it is not equal to the random value generated in the step (2) it will finish the session, otherwise the phone fetches the K value and decrypts {R 3 }K, it calculates a simple function {R 3 } (for example R 3 − 1), it generates a random value {R 4 } and it encrypts R 3 and R 4 with the K value.
6) Verify confirmation from NFC phone
Having the session key, the POS is able to decrypt the message in (6) . Then it checks for R 3 − 1, if it is a correct value, it will calculate R 4 − 1 value and encrypt it with K in order to give N a confirmation for knowing the session key. Else P finishes the session.
7) Verify confirmation from POS After the receipt of the step (6) command, the phone decrypts it and checks for the validity of R 4 value. If R 4 value is wrong, N will finishes the session.
IV. LOGIC OF EVENTS
Logic of events Xiao and [9] Bickford [8] and Bickford [9] is a theorem proving method proposed by Bickford Cornell University in 2003, it's a logic that describes protocols and algorithms in distributed system, and can formalize the basic primitives of security protocols.
A. SYMBOL DESCRIPTION
This section describes symbols and operators [21] involved in specifying mutual authentication protocol KerNeeS using logic of events. The basic symbols and its semantics are given in Table 2 .
An event structure is a model for L that satisfies the axioms [9] : 1) ≤ is a locally-finite partial order (every e has finitely many predecessors)
2) Local order, defined by e 1 < loc e 2 ≡ e 1 < e 2 ∧ loc(e 1 ) = loc (e 2 ), is a total ordering on any set of events whose members all have the same location.
B. EVENT CLASSESS
Our formal theory of authentication uses the language of event-orderings and another key concept-event classes. We describe protocols by classifying the events in the protocol. In authentication protocols there are send, receive, nonce, sign, verify, encrypt and decrypt events. Events in each class have associated information, and the type of this information depends on the class of the event. For example, a nonce VOLUME 6, 2018 AxiomD is similar except that for a decrypt event, the prior encrypt event has the same associated information except for the key, which, rather than being the same is a matching key.
Our theory includes a function Honest: Id → R that allows us to express assumptions about honest agents. In particular, honest agents do not release their private keys, so sign events with an honest signer; and encryption or decryption events that use the private key of an honest agent must occur at that agent. We call this axiom AxiomS (because it includes the properties of honest signers).
∀s : E(Sign).∀e : E(Encrypt).

∀d : E(Decrypt).Honest(A)
The assertion about nonces, one part of the axiom we call AxiomF (the flow property), is 
Two axioms state disjointness assumptions. The first simply says that an event in one of the seven special classes is not in any of the other special classes. It is stated concisely using a function, as follows.
The second disjointness axiom says that a nonce is not the same atom as an agent's private key, a signature, or a ciphertext. And, similarly, private keys, signatures, and ciphertexts are disjoint. One of these assumptions may deserve comment. A signature may be an encryption of a cryptographic hash of a plaintext, while a ciphertext is an encryption of a plaintext. Thus, as long as the hash of a well formed member of type Data is not a well-formed member of type Data a signature will not be equal to a ciphertext.
NonceCiphereAndKeysDisjoint : ∀n : E(New).∀s : E(Sign).∀e : E(Encrypt
The final axiom of Authentication Event Logic concerns the causal ordering between events that contain nonces. This is the most complex axiom, and to state it we need some auxiliary definitions. The type Act contains the events in any of the seven special classes-we call these actions. The relation (e has a) is true when action e has atom a. Its definition has the seven obvious cases:
e has a ≡ def (e ∈ E(New) ∧ New(e) has a) ∨(e ∈ E(Send) ∧ Send(e) has a) ∨ · · · We define the flow relation e 1 a → e 2 to mean that atom a flows from action e 1 to action e 2 . This can happen only in limited ways; either the actions e 1 or e 2 are at the same location, or there are intervening send and receive events that send atom a ''in the clear'', or atom a is in the plaintext of an encryption event, and the ciphertext flows to a matching 
D. REASONING RULES AND PROPERTIES
Two threads, thr 1 and thr 2 , form a matching conversation of length n if they both contain at least n messages and when the first n messages from each thread are paired, each pair
In this case, we have a strong matching conversation and write thr 1 ≈ thr 2 (the definition is straightforward, so we omit it to save space). A protocol that guarantees a strong matching conversation between two threads at different locations is said to satisfy a strong authentication property. The strong property prevents replay attacks and is much harder to prove than the corresponding weak property that leaves out the causal ordering requirement.
These following properties are proposed in paper [22] , which can be quoted directly in this paper to prove the security of protocol.
Property 1 (No Overlapping):
In the proof procedure of protocol analysis, for the action that have been verified in the matching conversation, the result can be directly used in new round of analysis to reduce redundancy. 
Property 3 (No Repeating):
In the proof procedure of event matching, if multiple events need to be verified at the same VOLUME 6, 2018 time, it's analyzed on the basic of from top to bottom to reduce repeated operations in proof procedure.
Property 4 (Not Considering Future Actions):
In the procedure of considering matching actions, we don't consider actions that did not happen afterwards only based on current events, so as to reduce proof complexity.
The security of Neuman-Stubblebine protocol and wireless mesh network authentication protocol are proved using logic of events in paper [22] - [24] . However, the interaction process of proven protocols are not complex. The KerNeeS protocol we want to analyze in this paper has three entities, and KerNeeS protocol has seven interaction steps. In order to overcome this challenge, migration rule has been proposed based on logic of events, property inheritance were derived to further reduce the redundancy and complexity in protocol analysis procedure, and improve the efficiency of protocol analysis.
Migration Rule: Thread thr is one of a basic sequence bss in A, written as thr=oneof (bss, A), where there are many subsequences in bss, written asbss i ∈ bss, as well as we have bss 1 ⊆ bss 2 .... ⊆ bss n . If the subsequence bss i possess event e, so bss i can migrate into next subsequence bss i+1 , which can be expressed formally as
Property 5 (Inheritability):
We can deduce the inheritability based on migration rule, it can be expressed formally as
Proof: If e i , e i+1 ∈ Eclass(x) and Event(e i ) = Event(e i+1 ) ⊂ bss i , obviously, e i , e i+1 ⊂ bss i ⊂ bss i+1 , according to Axiom flow relation and inheritability, Event(e i ) = Event(e i+1 ) ⊂ bss i ⊂ bss i+1 , then we can get a random value and do not care about the algorithm for generating a random value. In a word, we think that the underlying algorithm is secure and view encryption operation as a black-box model, and analyze the correctness of protocol interaction logic by logic of events.
A. PROOF PROCEDURES
Proving mutual authentication property of KerNeeS protocol based on logic of events, specific steps are as follows: 1. The logic of events is used to formally describe the security protocol, including specific actions of initiator and responder, standardizing basic sequence of the protocol, and confirming strong authentication property that meets security of protocol.
2. The subject is defined to be honest and abide by protocol, assuming that a thread is an instance of protocol's basic sequence, defining actions on the thread and determining matching events on protocol. Analyzing matching events, confirming whether there is a matching session and whether there is a matching event inside the matching session that requires further proving.
3. Analyzing whether the matching event is consistent with the matching session, if the consistence can be concluded and then proving matching session from the inside to the outside. If not, performing the screening verification of the next matching event to confirm whether whole matching events satisfy the weak matching. 4. Confirming that the matching session belongs to weak matching, analyzing the length of matching session in protocol interaction process, and confirming strong matching session according to axiomatic system. 5. After the establishment of one-way proof, the proof of two-way strong authentication [25] will be carried out. If proof is proved to be established, it means that the protocol is secure. In the whole proof procedures, if matching events can't meet weak matching, the protocol can't meet strong authentication property and can't guarantee mutual authentication in authentication stage. The protocol is easily attacked by an attacker who disguised as a legitimated agent, and the protocol is not secure. These steps mentioned above can be represented by the following flow chart in figure 2 .
B. DETAILED PROVING PROCESS
We use logic of events to sort out the basic interaction sequences of KerNeeS protocol, the description of protocol is shown in Figure 3 . s 1 ∼ s 7 are corresponding ciphertext generated by plaintext in encryption. P 1 ∼ P 7 , N 1 ∼ N 6 and A 1 ∼ A 2 are actions generated by POS, NFC phone and Authentication Server during protocol interaction.
Then, we formalize the expected properties using logic of events to analyze security of KerNeeS protocol. The basic sequence of KerNeeS protocol is shown in Figure 4 .
In KerNeeS protocol, the function of Authentication Server (AS) is to provides session key K for POS (P) and NFC phone (N). As sends encrypted message (s 3 , s 4 ) to P, where s 3 = {K , ID N , TS}K P and s 4 = {K , ID P , R 2 }K N , the important messages TS and R 2 can be decrypted from s 1 and s 2 . To ensure the confidentiality of session key K, the reliability of s 1 Suppose P = N = AS are both honest and obey KerNeeS protocol, thread thr 1 is an instance of P 7 . Let e 0 < loc e 1 < .... < loc e 13 , so the location of e 0 , e 1 , e 2 , . . . , e 13 is P. For some atoms R 1 , TS, s 1 , s 2 , s 3 , s 4 we have
By AxiomS and AxiomD, there is an event e such that e < e 6 ∧ DEMatch(e 6 , e ) ∧ loc(e ) = N ∧ loc(e ) = A VOLUME 6, 2018 So we can conclude
First, we take event e as the research object. Because AS obeys KerNeeS, action e must be a member of an instance belonging to one of the basic sequence of KerNeeS. The only one that include an Encrypt(_) action is P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 , P 5 , P 6 , P 7 , N 2 , N 3 , N 4 , N 5 , N 6 , A 2 . Next, we need to exclude each other and choose the action that matches event e .
According to Property 4 and Property 1, actions N 5 , N 6 occurs after P 7 , so N 5 , N 6 can be ruled out. According Property 2, under the prerequisite of compliance with Protocol(bss), events that the initiator or the responder participates in must be two parties or multiparty, so actions P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 , P 5 , P 6 , P 7 should be excluded, and actions N 2 , N 3 , N 4 , A 2 are left.
If e is an instance of N 2 , then for some atoms s 1 , R 2 , K N , s 2 , there is an e 1 < loc e such that
Comparing Encrypt(e 2 ) with Encrypt(e ), it's found that the requirement is obviously not satisfied, so action N 2 can be excluded. According to Property 5, there is no encryption event in N 3 and N 3 occurs after N 2 , so action N 3 can be excluded.
For N 4 , we have
It's easy to observe that the first part of N 4 is inherited from N 3 , according to Property 5, the first part of N 4 could be excluded, so we only need to consider the rest of N 4 to simply complexity of proof. If e is an instance of N 4 , then for some atoms R 4 , <R 3 − 1, R 4 > , K , s 6 , there is an e 2 < e such that New(e 2 ) = R 4 ∧ Encrypt(e 3 ) = < R 3 − 1, R 4 > , K , s 6 Compared Encrypt(e 3 ) with Encrypt(e ) = < K , ID N , TS >, KP, s 3 , we can found that their format of encrypted message are different, so N 4 can be excluded.
If e is an instance of A 2 , according to replacement rule [21] , the U can replace POS and V can replace NFC phone. For U and atoms ID U , ID V , 1 s 1 , 1 s 2 , 1 s 3 , 1 s 4 4 , e 5 in POS, we can conclude e 0 < loc e 1 < loc e 2 < loc e 3 < loc e 4 < loc e 5 ∧ Rcv(e 0 )
In formula (2), encryption event e 3 need to satisfy the following requirement
We can conclude that e 3 = e , so we have 1 
it's drawn the following formula by substituting result into formula (2). e 0 < loc e 1 < loc e 2 < loc e 3 < loc e 4 < loc e 5 ∧ Rcv(e 0 )
By AxiomD and AxiomS, the presence of event e and e enable action A 2 to satisfy the following formula 1) ∃e , e < e 2 ∧ DEmatch(e 2 , e ) ∧ loc(e ) = P ∧ loc(e ) = N 2) ∃e , e < e 2 ∧ DEmatch(e 2 , e ) ∧ loc(e ) = P ∧ loc(e ) = N According to Property 3, we consider e as research object in the first. AS obeys KerNeeS protocol. Event e is an instance of basic sequence, these actions includes Encrypt(_) operation are P 1 , P 2 , P 3 , P 4 , P 5 , P 6 
need to be satisfied, it can be drawn that 1 R 2 = 2 R 2 , 1 s 1 = 2 s 1 , 1 s 2 = 2 s 2 . We can conclude the following formula by substituting result into formula (2) .
Now, looking back to event e , If e is an instance of P 1 , for some atoms 3 R 1 , 3 s 1 , there are events e 0 , e 1 , e 2 such that
Encrypt(e ) need to be satisfied, so it can be easily drawn that 1 
We can conclude the following formula by substituting result into formula (6) .
According to lemma 1 (unique nonce) and lemma 2 (nonce release), there are equations 1 R 1 = R 1 and 1 R 2 = R 2 . In addition, we can derive equations 1 s 1 = s 1 and 1 s 2 = s 2 from s 1 = {R 1 , TS}K P , s 2 = {R 2 , s 1 }K N in KerNeeS protocol, we have
So we can conclude that Send(e 2 ) = s 1 = Rcv(e 0 ) and Send(e 3 ) = (ID, s 2 ) = Rcv(e 4 ). These two send-receive actions include message s 1 , s 2 , therefore AS got plaintext R 2 and TS by decrypting s 1 , s 2 . We can believe the reliability of s 3 , s 4 , K by AxiomS.
When P received the session key K from AS, the rest part of KerNeeS is a process of exchanging K between P and N . Since the reliability for s 3 , s 4 , K in first part of protocol have been proved, in order to simply proving procedures, s 3 , s 4 , K will not be considered in rest part.
Suppose P = N = AS are both honest and obey KerNeeS, and suppose that thread thr 2 is an instance of P 7 . Let e (4) 0 < loc e (4) 1 < loc e (4) 2 < loc e (4) New(e (4) 
By AxiomS and AxiomD, there is an event e (4) such that
4 , e (4) ) ∧ loc(e (4) ∧ Rcv(e
It can be easily found that a decryption event Decrypt(e (5) 1 ) =< R 3 , K , 5 s 5 > exists in formula (17) , by AxiomD and AxiomS, there is an event e (5) such that
1 , e (5) ) ∧ loc(e (5) 
If e (5) is an instance of P 5 , then for some atoms 6 R 3 , 6 K, 6 s 4 , 6 s 5 and some location P, there are events e (6) 0 , e (6) 1 , e (6) 2 such that e (6) 0 < loc e (6) 1 < loc e (6) 2 ∧ New(e (6) 
It need to satisfy Encrypt(e (5) ) =< R 3 , K , 5 s 5 >=< 6 R 3 , 6 K, 6 s 5 >= Encrypt(e (6) 1 ), so we have R 3 = 6 R 3 , 6 K = K and 5 s 5 = 6 s 5 . We can conclude the following formula by substituting result into formula (18) . e (6) 0 < loc e (6) 1 < loc e (6) 2 ∧ New(e (6) 
There are two equations Send(e (4) 3 ) is equal to Send(e (5) 4 ), therefore we get two pairs of matching conversations.
To prove KNS| = auth(P 7 , 6), we need to get six pairs of strong matching conversations. To prove strong matching conversation, we must first have strong matching. In the above proof procedure, we get six pairs of weak matching conservations as follows. In order to prove that KerNeeS satisfies strong matching conversation, we must prove e 2 < e 0 , e 3 < e 3 , e 4 < e 0 , e 5 < e 5 , e (6) 2 < e (5) 0 , e (4) 3 < e (5) 4 , let taking events e (4) 3 , e (5) 4 as an example to illustrate.
Suppose P = N = AS are both honest and obey KerNeeS, according to AxiomF and flow relation, there is an event s releasing R between e 4 ≤ s, the sorting result e (4) 3 < e (5) 4 can be obtained. In the next step we rule out e (4) 3 < loc j < loc e (5) 4 , if the relationship e (4) 3 < loc j < loc e (5) 4 holds, the event s must be a membership of P, however we know that there is no sending action between e (4) 3 and e (5) 4 in thread thr 2 by lemma 2(nonce release), which means that R will be not released before event e (5) 4 . By using similar method, we also can prove e 2 < e 0 , e 3 < e 3 , e 4 < e 0 , e 5 < e 5 and e (6) 2 < e (5) 0 . According to the above proof procedures, there are six pairs of strong matching conversations at location P in KerNeeS, it means that we can prove KNS| = auth(P 7 , 6).
Similarly, KNS = auth(N 6 , 5) can be proved. The KerNeeS protocol satisfies strong authentication property, the security of KerNeeS protocol is proved and the session key is confirmed during the interaction of entities, it means that mutual authentication property can be guaranteed between POS and NFC phone. The KerNeeS protocol is secure and the attacker can't carry on replay attack by disguising as a legitimate user.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Mobile payment based on NFC technology brings great conveniences to people's lives, but the security issues existing in NFC technology threaten the development of mobile payment. In this paper, based on logic of events, we propose migration rule and then derive inheritability from the rule of axiom cluster in order to optimize the application of logic of events. These reasoning rules and properties are mainly used to reduce complexity and redundancy in the process of protocol analysis, optimize security protocol analysis method and use axiomatic system and reasoning rules to conduct formal analysis of KerNeeS protocol, and conclude that the protocol is secure which can guarantee mutual authentication between POS and NFC phone. The mutual authentication property is only analyzed based on logic of events in this paper. However, in real mobile payment scenarios, considering the presence of eavesdroppers, it's a promising new prospect to implement secure NFC mobile payment based on physical layer [17] - [19] to solve the security problem of wireless network. In addition, in order to improve system performance, incorporating other wireless transmission techniques [26] , [27] can be the reference for practical system implementation of NFC mobile payment.
